nGraph-HE: A Graph Compiler for Deep Learning on Homomorphically
  Encrypted Data by Boemer, Fabian et al.
nGraph-HE: A Graph Compiler for Deep Learning on
Homomorphically Encrypted Data
Fabian Boemer
fabian.boemer@intel.com
Intel AI Research
San Diego, California, USA
Yixing Lao
yixing.lao@intel.com
Intel AI Research
San Diego, California, USA
Rosario Cammarota
rosario.cammarota@intel.com
Intel AI Research
San Diego, California, USA
Casimir Wierzynski
casimir.wierzynski@intel.com
Intel AI Research
San Diego, California, USA
ABSTRACT
Homomorphic encryption (HE)—the ability to perform computation
on encrypted data—is an attractive remedy to increasing concerns
about data privacy in deep learning (DL). However, building DL
models that operate on ciphertext is currently labor-intensive and
requires simultaneous expertise in DL, cryptography, and software
engineering. DL frameworks and recent advances in graph com-
pilers have greatly accelerated the training and deployment of DL
models to various computing platforms. We introduce nGraph-HE,
an extension of nGraph, Intel’s DL graph compiler, which enables
deployment of trained models with popular frameworks such as
TensorFlow while simply treating HE as another hardware target.
Our graph-compiler approach enables HE-aware optimizations– im-
plemented at compile-time, such as constant folding and HE-SIMD
packing, and at run-time, such as special value plaintext bypass.
Furthermore, nGraph-HE integrates with DL frameworks such as
TensorFlow, enabling data scientists to benchmark DL models with
minimal overhead.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Mathematics of computing→Mathematical software; • Se-
curity and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols.
KEYWORDS
Homomorphic encryption, intermediate representation, deep learn-
ing
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the key challenges in deploying machine learning (ML) at
scale is how to help data owners learn from their data while pro-
tecting their privacy. This issue has become more pressing with the
advent of regulations such as the General Data Protection Regula-
tion [54]. It might seem as though âĂĲprivacy-preserving machine
learningâĂİ would be a self-contradiction: ML wants data, while
privacy hides data [55]. One promising solution to this problem is
known as homomorphic encryption (HE). Using HE, one can per-
form computation on encrypted data without decrypting it. Data
owners can encrypt their data with the public key, send it to a
data processor that has no access to the secret key, and receive
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the answer to their query in encrypted form, which only the data
owner can unlock with the secret key.
The idea of HE dates back to 1978 [44], and theoretical break-
throughs occurred in 2009 [27] to make the idea real but highly
impractical. Further algorithmic breakthroughs have occurred since
then, in tandem with the development of post-quantum cryptosys-
tems and their implementations [7, 42] to yield HE schemes that
map naturally onto vector addition and multiplication—the core of
DL workloads. Recent work has shown the feasibility of evaluating
convolutional neural networks using lattice-based HE cryptosys-
tems [21, 28, 31, 34, 39, 47].
One of the biggest accelerators in DL has been the development
and rapid adoption of software frameworks, such as TensorFlow [2],
MXNet [16] and PyTorch [43], making use of open-source graph
compilers such as Intel nGraph [49], XLA [1] and TVM [17], that al-
low data scientists to describe DL networks and operations at a high
level while hiding details of their software and hardware implemen-
tation. By contrast, a key challenge for building privacy-preserving
DL systems using HE has been the lack of such a framework. As
a result, developing and deploying DL models that operate on ci-
phertext is currently labor intensive and forces data scientists to
become experts in DL, cryptography, and software engineering.
In this work, we leverage recent work in graph compilers to
overcome this challenge. Specifically, we present nGraph-HE, an
HE backend to the Intel nGraph DL graph compiler that allows
data scientists to train networks on the hardware of their choice
in plaintext, then easily deploy these models to HE cryptosystems
that operate on encrypted data. The core idea is to create a privacy-
preserving hardware abstraction layer, with its own instruction
set architecture (ISA) (Section 3.3) and optimization support (Sec-
tion 3.4). This hides the complexity of HE from data scientists while
exploiting the considerable compiler tooling and DL frameworks
that the DL community has built (Figure 1). Using this approach, for
example, modifying an existing TensorFlow model to operate on
encrypted data becomes as easy as adding a single line of code (Ap-
pendix A.2). Indeed, the open-source release of this framework1 has
already gathered significant attention in the DL community [41, 56].
Using HE to implement DL computations imposes a number
of constraints due to the mathematical requirements of HE and
DL themselves, such as limited arithmetic depth and polynomial
1The nGraph-HE library is available under the Apache 2.0 license at https://ngra.ph/he
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Figure 1: Overview of the nGraph-HE software stack.
nGraph-HE currently supports the SEAL encryption li-
brary [36], and the underlying cryptosystems BFV [5] and
CKKS [18], and it can be extended to support additional
cryptosystems.
activation functions (Section 2.2). Overcoming these constraints is
an area of active algorithmic research [21, 28, 31, 34, 39, 47]. The
contributions of this paper are along a different vector, namely, how
to provide a software framework for developing privacy-preserving
DL models that cleanly separates DL and HE functions (Figure 1).
This will enable the DL and HE communities to improve their own
technologies as independently as possible while still enjoying the
advances of the other with minimal changes to the high-level code.
In this paper, we present the following:
(1) We describe an efficient software framework for combining
DL and HE. To our knowledge, we present the first use of
a DL graph compiler and intermediate representation (IR)
to accelerate the development and deployment of privacy-
preserving machine learning models.
(2) We develop HE-aware graph-compiler optimizations, both
at compile-time and at run-time. The compile-time optimiza-
tions include graph-level optimizations such as batch-norm
folding and parallel operations through HE-SIMD packing
and OpenMP parallelization. Runtime optimizations include
special plaintext value bypass and ciphertext-plaintext oper-
ations.
(3) We demonstrate the framework on: (1) subgraphs of DL
models: general matrix-matrix multiplication (GEMM) oper-
ations, and a convolution-batch-norm operation; and (2) two
convolutional neural network benchmark problems (MNIST
and CIFAR-10) with different choices of encryption parame-
ters, using Python and TensorFlow. Furthermore, we verify
that the runtime overhead imposed by the additional soft-
ware layers is small (0.1% of total runtime) compared to
implementing these operations in C++ using HE libraries
directly.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Homomorphic encryption
What does it mean for a cryptosystem to be homomorphic? In-
formally, an encryption function E and its decryption function
D are homomorphic with respect to a class of functions F if for
Figure 2: Simple model of secure inference via HE.
any function f ∈ F , we can construct a function д such that
f (x) = D (д(E(x))) for some set of x that we care about2. That is,
for certain cryptosystems and target functions, it is possible to map
a desired computation (the function f ) on plaintext into a specific
computation on ciphertext (the function д) whose result, when de-
crypted, matches the desired plaintext result. For a detailed review
of HE, we refer the reader to [3].
Figure 2 shows how this property enables a user, Alice, to per-
form inference on private data using a remote, untrusted computer.
The remote machine receives a ciphertext from Alice (with no de-
cryption key), executes a function д on the ciphertext, then returns
the result to Alice. Alice then decrypts the result to reveal the plain-
text for f (x). At no point does the remote machine gain access
to Alice’s unencrypted data. An analogous setup provides secure
inference in the case where the function д is kept private, while
the data remains unencrypted, as might occur when, for example,
д corresponds to a proprietary 3rd party DL model.
One important property of RLWE-based HE schemes is semantic
security, which is the inability of a computationally bounded adver-
sary to distinguish between the ciphertexts of known plaintexts.
Notably, E(x) , E(y), even when x = y. This is due to random noise
which is introduced during the encryption process. Without this
property, a malicious remote server in Figure 2 might be able to
deduce f (x) in cases where д maps to a finite number of outputs, as
in binary classification problem, by performing inference on inputs
whose classification is already known.
2.2 Challenges of homomorphically encrypted
deep learning
HE schemes are often subject to several mathematical limitations:
Supported functions. Some HE schemes only support a single
algebraic operation, such as addition or multiplication. These are
known as “partially homomorphic” schemes (PHE). Others schemes,
called “fully homomorphic” (FHE), support two, such as addition
andmultiplication. Note that composing addition andmultiplication
suffices to construct polynomial functions, and hence polynomial
approximations to non-polynomial functions such as sigmoid or
ReLU3. Notably, this limitation prevents the exact computation of
any comparison-based operations, such as Max, Min, and ReLU,
as well as common functions such as exponential or sigmoid. One
workaround to this limitation in the case of a final softmax layer
is to leave the softmax calculation to our user Alice after she de-
crypts the model outputs. Finally, “leveled homomorphic” schemes
2We are omitting the public and secret keys that would also be arguments for the
encryption and decryption functions.
3Going further, by building gates out of addition and multiplication over GF(2), one
can in theory implement any boolean circuit, and hence any computable function.
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(LHE) support addition and multiplication, but only up to a fixed
computational depth.
Computational depth. HE schemes derived from Gentry’s
original lattice-based system [27] rely on noise to hide plaintext.
This encryption noise tends to accumulate with each homomorphic
operation, and decryption becomes impossible if this noise exceeds
a threshold. One common solution to this problem is to constrain
the depth of the computation and set encryption parameters accord-
ingly. Other solutions involve noise management techniques such
as bootstrapping, which, depending on the HE scheme, may incur
significant computational costs, but can extend the computational
depth indefinitely. LHE schemes do not perform bootstrapping,
relying instead on the fixed computational depth of DL models.
Number fields.Most HE schemes operate over integers [29, 36],
while others use booleans [20] or real numbers [19]. One particular
challenge in the case of integer-based schemes is scaling the mag-
nitude of numbers by factors less than 1. Most DL models require
real, i.e., non-integer, numbers, so adapting integer HE schemes
typically involves mapping large integers to a fixed-point repre-
sentation using a scaling factor. Preventing the scaling factor from
accumulating, however, requires division by the scaling factor after
each multiplication, which is not possible in all HE schemes.
Computational and memory load. The cryptographic com-
putations required to implement HE typically consume several or-
ders of magnitude more CPU time and memory compared to their
plaintext counterparts. These costs have long been the critique of
HE. A detailed response to these critiques is out of the scope of this
paper, but we note that there have been dramatic improvements
in this area—for example, the runtime for homomorphic inference
on the seminal CryptoNets MNIST network has been reduced from
297.5s [28] to 0.03s [34] in two years (although the latter uses a
hybrid scheme; see Section 5).
From a software engineering perspective, there is additional
complexity: there are multiple libraries for HE [19, 20, 29, 36, 45],
based on multiple HE schemes [48], and with a variety of APIs
(with some notable attempts to provide uniformity [8, 45]). This
diversity makes it difficult for developers to evaluate the tradeoffs
of different schemes in the context of their specific applications.
Moreover, the complexity of implementing DL models has led to
the development of multiple DL libraries [2, 16, 33, 43, 52, 57]. Fi-
nally, and not surprisingly, no currently-available DL libraries were
designed with HE in mind, and vice-versa. As a result, developers
of privacy-preserving DL models have been forced either to import
DL functions into HE code, or HE functions into DL code, with
large code changes required if either of these library choices should
change.
Given the computational and memory overhead of HE, we target
inference, rather than training. The inference use case is also par-
ticularly relevant from a privacy point of view, given that statistical
techniques such as differential privacy do not easily apply to the
case of protecting the privacy of the query.
2.3 Mathematical Background
We provide a brief introduction to the mathematical objects used
in HE. Many HE schemes are based on the assumed hardness of
the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem [40], which uses
polynomials whose coefficients are members of a finite field. [9].
In particular, let N = 2n for some positive integer n. N is known
as the polynomial modulus degree. Let R = Z [x]/(xN + 1) be the
ring of integer-coefficient polynomials with degree at most N . We
denote by Ra = Za [x]/(xN + 1) the same ring as R, but whose
coefficients are integers modulo a. The plaintexts and ciphertexts in
the HE schemes we consider consist of pairs or lists of polynomials
in Rt and Rq , where t ,q > 0 are known as the plaintext modulus
and ciphertext modulus, respectively. In practice, t ,q are often large
enough that, for performance reasons, they are decomposed as
q =
∏
i qi , t =
∏
i ti , where qi and ti are known as ciphertext coeffi-
cient moduli and plaintext coefficient moduli, respectively. Typically,
multiplying two ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ R j+1q of size j + 1 results in
a ciphertext of larger size, up to j2/2 in the BV scheme [10], and
2j + 1 in the BFV and CKKS encryption schemes [36]. Subsequent
operations on these larger ciphertexts become slower; however, an
operation called relinearization reduces the length of each cipher-
text to mitigate this slowdown. Performing relinearization requires
a public relinearization key.
These RLWE parameters, including the polynomial modulus de-
gree, ciphertext moduli, and plaintext moduli, are chosen to ensure
a security level, measured in bits, where λ-bit security indicates ∼2λ
operations are required to break the encryption [38, 53]. The choice
of λ depends on the security needs of the application, with typical
values for λ being 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. The runtime re-
quirements to mitigate several attacks on different security levels
are detailed in [15]. Additionally, the parameters need to be chosen
sufficiently large such that the amplification of the random noise
during arithmetic operations does not render the original message
unrecoverable. Specifically, each ciphertext (or plaintext) encoded
in Rq (or Rt ) is associated with a level l with, 0 ≤ l ≤ L, where
L is maximum multiplicative depth. The multiplicative depth L is
one of the parameters to the HE scheme in addition to the RLWE
parameters. The HE scheme allows at most l multiplications on the
ciphertext. Multiplication is typically much more expensive than
addition, so the multiplicative depth of the desired computation, Lf ,
is an important consideration when computing on HE. Hence, for
an assigned computation of a certain multiplicative depth L ≥ Lf ,
HE parameters are selected to guarantee, for example, 128-bit secu-
rity. The choice of parameters presents a trade-off between security
to preserve data privacy, and speed of computation.
2.4 Related Work
While there has been much previous work detailing algorithmic
improvements to HE for DL [21, 28, 31, 34, 39, 47], there have
been only a few notable efforts to provide privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning software frameworks. PySyft [46] is a generic frame-
work for distributed, privacy-preserving DL, built on PyTorch, that
uses multi-party computation (MPC) for private computation. TF-
encrypted [24] also enables private machine learning via MPC, and
is built on TensorFlow. Both of these systems are tied to a specific
DL framework and use MPC, not HE, which assumes a different
security model. By contrast, by operating on computational graphs,
nGraph-HE enables users of multiple DL frameworks (Figure 1),
and requires much smaller code changes to non-HE code to invoke—
potentially only one line (Appendix A.2).
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There have also been some recent compiler projects around HE.
The RAMPARTS project [4] translates models from the Julia lan-
guage to HE operations implemented by PALISADE HE library [45].
No source code for the compiler is available, and source language
support is limited to Julia. Moreover, the PALISADE library does
not currently support CKKS, the HE scheme of choice for DL. The
Cingulata [13] compiler uses C++ as a source language and targets
a custom implementation of the Fan-Vercauteren HE scheme. Be-
cause it first translates computations into boolean circuits rather
than arithmetic compute graphs, it loses performance on DL opera-
tions such as GEMM. SHEEP [32] describes an abstract ISA for HE,
and includes several HE schemes and implementations. However,
the low-level language and lack of compiler make it difficult to use
as a data science tool.
The CHET project [25] also describes an ISA and a compiler for
HE, but adopts a different approach from nGraph-HE. Whereas
CHET performs compiler optimizations for HE at code generation
time, just as any traditional compilation approach, nGraph-HE
elevates optimizations for HE to the DL framework level, simi-
larly to what frameworks such as TVM [17] do. Furthermore, to
date, nGraph-HE is the only existing open-source framework for
privacy-preserving DL. nGraph-HE’s ability to support existing
DL frameworks such as TensorFlow with minimal code changes is
vital for data scientists, who must be able to rapidly prototype the
accuracy and performance of DL models.
2.5 The power of graph compilers
DL frameworks, such as TensorFlow, MXNet and PyTorch, have
greatly accelerated the development of DL models, allowing data
scientists to express DL operations in high-level languages that
can be easily ported from one platform to another (from a laptop
to a cloud-based server, e.g.). Graph compilers, such as the open-
source Intel nGraph, have recently been developed to attack the
challenge of optimizing performance on multiple DL frameworks
and hardware targets. Compiling high-level framework code into an
IR—a computation graph—removes the need to generate optimized
code for each (framework, hardware target) pair. Instead, in order
to use a new hardware target for all frameworks, one only needs
to develop optimized code for each operation in the computation
graph for the targeted hardware. In addition, the graph can be
an advantageous representation for reasoning about higher-level
optimizations, such as fusing operations, vectorization, etc.
These advantages apply directly to expressing DL computations
using HE. By treating HE schemes and the operations they support
as instructions on a virtual machine [29], we can enable HE com-
putations to a large set of DL frameworks while providing a clean
separation between DL and HE technologies. Moreover, as in the
case of deep learning, the graph representation facilitates various
HE-specific optimizations, such as reducing computation depth and
identifying opportunities for parallelism.
3 NGRAPH-HE
We first describe the API adopted by nGraph-HE, as well as the
mapping onto two currently supported cryptosystems: BFV [5] and
CKKS [18], both implemented by the SEAL encryption library [36].
We then discuss compile-time and runtime optimizations used in
nGraph-HE. These include HE-specific optimizations that exploit
the capabilities of the underlying cryptosystems, as well as paral-
lelization methods to reduce execution time. Lastly, we discuss how
to support additional cryptosystems.
One difficulty in providing a unified framework for HE has
been the variety of APIs and supported operations for various
HE schemes. Following [11], our API has three components: (1) a
cryptographic context, which contains the static parameters of the
encryption scheme, (2) a payload representation, which contains the
data, and (3) an assembly language, which describes the functions
implemented by the encryption scheme.
3.1 Cryptographic context
The cryptographic context stores the parameters of the cryptosys-
tem, which consist of:
• polynomial modulus degree (N );
• plaintext moduli (t =∏i ti );
• ciphertext moduli (q =∏Li=1 qi );
• security level (λ);
• HE scheme as a unique string representation.
Depending on the cryptosystem, one or more of these parameters
may not be required. The HE scheme implementations we currently
support do not include bootstrapping; as such, we expect the cryp-
tographic context to include enough ciphertext moduli to support
the multiplicative depth of the DL model, i.e., L ≥ Lf . The user
will specify the cryptographic context as a command-line variable.
In nGraph-HE, the “HEBackend” class stores the cryptographic
context, as well as instantiations of (public, secret, relinearization)
key tuples.
3.2 Payload representation
The payload representation stores the data and consists of plaintext
and ciphertext representations. In nGraph-HE, the payload is stored
in the “HETensor” class, which stores a pointer to an “HEBackend”,
necessary to obtain the keys. Figure 3 shows the relation between
the terms in the payload representation. Specifically, we have :
Data (K) Plaintext (P) Ciphertext (C)
Encode
Decode
Encrypt
Decrypt
Figure 3: Relation between payload terms.
• data: (K). Usually K = Rs or K = Zs , s ∈ N, a vector of
numbers.
• encode: (K → P). Uses the cryptographic context.
• encrypt: (P → C). Uses the public key.
• decrypt: (C → P). Uses the secret key.
• decode: (P → K). Uses the cryptographic context.
This overall abstraction strictly generalizes the standard (encrypt,
decrypt) model, since the encode and decode functions can be
identity mappings. This allows us to store pre-computed plaintext
values for optimization (Section 3.4.1).
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3.3 Assembly language
We describe the assembly language of nGraph-HE in terms of
nGraph operations [49]. There are four low-level operations, which
are typically supported by the APIs of HE cryptosystems:
• Add: (C ∪ P) × C → C.
• Subtract: (C ∪ P) × C → C.
• Multiply: (C ∪ P) × C → C. For efficiency, the implemen-
tation should use relinearization if possible.
• Negate: C → C.
Additionally, HE schemes will often implement a plaintext ver-
sion (P → P or P × P → P) of each operation. Based on these
low-level operations, nGraph-HE provides efficient parallelized im-
plementations for the following compound operations: AvgPool,
Convolution, and Dot. Developers can overwrite these default im-
plementations with cryptosystem-specific optimizations.
nGraph-HE also provides implementations for the following ten-
sor manipulation operations: Broadcast, Concat, Pad, Reshape,
Reverse, and Slice. See Table 1 for a full list of supported opera-
tions and their mapping to TensorFlow operations.
Table 1: Supported operations and mapping to TensorFlow
operations.
nGraph/nGraph-HE op TensorFlow op
Add tf.add
AvgPool tf.nn.avg_pool
Broadcast tf.broadcast_to
Concat tf.concat
Constant tf.constant
Convolution tf.nn.convolution
Dot tf.matmul
Multiply tf.multiply, tf.square
Negate tf.negative
Pad tf.pad
Reshape tf.reshape
Reverse tf.reverse
Slice tf.slice
Subtract tf.subtract
Sum tf.reduce_sum
Parameter tf.placeholder
Concretely, the nGraph-HE API consists of the following major
components, shown in Figure 4:
• Backend. This stores the cryptographic context, and per-
forms graph-level optimizations. The HESealBackend and
HEBFVBackend classes inherit from HEBackend class, which,
in turn inherits from nGraph’s Backend class.
• Tensor. This stores the data. HEPlainTensor and HECipherTen-
sor inherit fromHETensor, which in turn inherits fromnGraph’s
Tensor class. HEPlainTensors store HEPlaintext’s, which is
an abstract class from which seal::Plaintext inherits; HECi-
pherTensors operate analogously.
• Kernel. The kernel consists of stand-alone implementations
of nGraph ops. Each implementation operates on HEPlain-
text and HECiphertext inputs, which are dynamically cast to
Backend
ngraph::Backend
HEBackend
HESeal
Backend
Tensor
ngraph::Tensor
HETensor
HEPlain
Tensor
HECipher
Tensor
HEPlaintext HECiphertext
seal::
Plaintext
seal::
Ciphertext
ngraph::op
Add
AddSeal
Kernel
Conv
ConvSeal
Mult
MultSeal
Figure 4: Visualization of nGraph-HE architecture. Objects
with the same color interact. The dotted line from Conv to
ConvSeal indicates optional overriding of the default Conv
implementation.
the appropriate cryptosystem-specific type at runtime. The
Tensor class hierarchy enables nGraph-HE to provide default
implementations for each operation when no cryptosystem-
specific implementation is present. This further decreases
the overhead in adding a new cryptosystem to nGraph-HE.
3.4 Optimizations
One of the benefits of using a compiler approach to homomorphic
computation is the ability to perform optimizations that exploit
the structure of the computation, the underlying cryptosystem,
and the hardware. To illustrate this benefit, we implemented three
classes of optimizations of which the first is run-time, and the
second two are compile-time optimizations: (1) detection of special
plaintext values; (2) mapping ISA-level parallelism in the privacy-
preserving abstraction layer onto the parallel structures found in
HE and modern microprocessors; and (3) graph-level optimizations.
3.4.1 Special plaintext value bypass. Operations between a cipher-
text and a plaintext may arise when either the model or the data
are encrypted, but not both. When performing such operations,
nGraph-HE detects special values in the plaintext and, when pos-
sible, bypasses the corresponding HE operations. These runtime
optimizations are HE-specific strength-reduction optimizations.
Specifically, where c ∈ C is a ciphertext, and p(i) ∈ P is the plain-
text encoding of i we implement:
• c ± p(0): bypass HE operations and return c;
• c ×p(0): bypassHE operations and return a freshly-encrypted
zero ciphertext, thereby resetting the noise budget;
• c × p(1): bypass HE operations and return c;
• c × p(−1): return the negation of c , avoiding an expensive
multiply operation.
Bypassing HE operations not only reduces or resets encryption
noise accumulation but also reduces runtime. One benefit of using
a graph compiler is that higher-level compound operations, such as
Dot and Convolution, automatically inherit the benefits of these
optimizations. For instance, in a binarized neural network with
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binary convolution kernels, applying a Convolution operation
will not invoke any calls to Multiply. To accommodate different
binarization settings, we allow the user to independently enable
or disable the Optimized Multiply and Optimized Addition plain-
text value bypass. We demonstrate some of these runtime benefits
quantitatively in Section 4.1 and Section 4.3.
3.4.2 Parallel operations: (1)HE-SIMDpacking. SomeHE schemes
(including BFV and CKKS) support Single Instruction Multiple Data
(SIMD) operations [50], which we refer to as “HE-SIMD” operations
to avoid confusion with the usage of the “SIMD” term in computer
architecture. In simple terms, a vector of payload values can be
encoded and encrypted as a single ciphertext, and operations on
this ciphertext are equivalent to the same HE-SIMD operation on
the values in the vector individually. nGraph-HE utilizes HE-SIMD
packing across the mini-batch dimension, as in [28]. Concretely,
given a 4D tensor with shape (N ,C,H ,W ) format (batch size, chan-
nels, height, width), which typically requires N ×C ×H ×W cipher-
texts, nGraph-HE uses HE-SIMD packing to store the tensor as a
3D tensor ofC×H ×W ciphertexts, with each ciphertext packing N
values. As shown in Section 4.3, running models with different mini-
batch sizes (within the maximum allowed size) gives near-identical
runtimes, significantly increasing the inference throughput. Anal-
ogously, loop unrolling in standard compiler optimization selects
the amount of unrolling to maximize the number of utilized slots
in vectorized operations. Here, increasing the batch size maximizes
the number of utilized slots in each ciphertext.
Recent work [25, 34] has experimented with using HE-SIMD
packing to store NCHW-formatted tensors as different 2D or 3D
tensors, improving on both memory usage and runtime on small
batch sizes. However, although efficient operations for convolu-
tion and dot product exist in these packing schemes, reshape and
broadcast operations become more complicated, and the ciphertext
slots are more difficult to utilize entirely. Hence, our choice of HE-
SIMD packing represents a performance tradeoff, optimizing for
throughput and simplicity of implementation over latency.
(2) OpenMP parallelization. nGraph-HE makes extensive use
of OpenMP [23], an API for shared-memory programming, for par-
allelization. It is used in data encryption and decryption, unary
and binary element-wise operations, GEMM operations, and convo-
lution. Different from HE-SIMD packing, OpenMP parallelization
is applied to non-mini-batch dimensions. For instance, to encrypt
a batch of 1024 images with shape 28 × 28, nGraph-HE encrypts
the values at the first pixel location across all 1024 images as one
ciphertext with HE-SIMD packing, and does so for all 784 pixel
locations in parallel with OpenMP, resulting in a total of 784 cipher-
texts. OpenMP parallelization significantly reduces the inference
latency of our system.
3.4.3 Graph-level optimizations. One advantage of graph compil-
ers is the ability to offer higher-level optimizations based on the
computation graph. We briefly describe several graph optimizations
analogous to standard compiler optimization of constant propaga-
tion and which are particularly relevant for HE.
• AvgPool folding. An AvgPool layer with window size s1 × s2,
followed by a Convolutional (Conv) layer with weightsW
is replaced by the equivalent ScaledMeanPool operation fol-
lowed by a Conv layer with weightsW /(s1×s2). This reduces
the multiplicative depth Lf from two to one.
• Activation folding. A Conv or Fully Connected (FC) layer
with weightsW followed by a polynomial activation of the
form ax2 +bx +c is equivalent to the same Conv or FC layer
with weights aW , followed by a polynomial activation of the
form x2 + (b/a)x + (c/a). This reduces Lf from two to one.
• Batch-Norm folding. A Conv or FC layer followed by a Batch-
Norm (BN) has the form:
z =W ∗ x ; zˆ = z − µz√
σ 2z + ϵ
; zBN = γ zˆ + β
where γ , β , µz ,σz are all fixed during inference. A naïve im-
plementation would require a multiplicative depth Lf = 2:
one to compute z, and one to compute zBN = γˆz + βˆ , where
γˆ =
(
γ√
σ 2z+ϵ
)
and βˆ =
(
β − γ µZ√
σ 2Z+ϵ
)
are constants at in-
ference. However, we can equivalently compute zBN =
(W γˆ ) ∗ x + βˆ where (W γˆ ) is also constant at inference. This
simplified representation has multiplicative depth Lf = 1.
These optimizations are also possible in non-HE settings; for in-
stance, BN folding is implemented in TensorFlow. However, the
reduction in Lf makes these optimizations especially useful in HE
models. For instance, AvgPool folding is used in the CryptoNets
model [28]. See Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.2 for examples of BN
folding.
3.5 Ciphertext-plaintext operations
HE implementations of ciphertext-plaintext operations C × P →
C are typically much faster than implementations of ciphertext-
ciphertext operations C × C → C. To take advantage of this per-
formance gain, nGraph-HE allows for three distinct computing
paradigms, based on the privacy needs of the application.
• Encrypted data, unencrypted model. This use case occurs
when private data are obtained from medical patients, while
the model is kept on a remote server. This paradigm is the
fastest, as it allows the most number of C × P operations.
• Encrypted model, unencrypted data. This is the case when a
company deploys a proprietary model to untrusted servers.
• Encrypted data, encrypted model. Here, both the model and
data are kept encrypted for most privacy, at the cost of the
slowest runtime. This use case might occur when a company
deploys a proprietary model to perform computations on
sensitive data on untrusted hardware.
For debugging purposes, nGraph-HE also offers each operation in
plaintext: P × P → P or P → P.
3.6 Adding a new cryptosystem
Currently, nGraph-HE supports two cryptosystems, each imple-
mented by the SEAL encryption library: BFV and CKKS. To support
another cryptosystem, one simply needs to implement the storage
model and the low-level operations in the assembly language in-
structions described above. Most HE cryptosystems already include
similar APIs, so the implementation is usually straightforward. As
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shown in Section 3.3, nGraph-HE provides default implementa-
tions for higher-level compound ops such as Dot and Convolution,
which may be overridden with more efficient cryptosystem-specific
implementations by the developer.
3.7 DL Framework Integration
A critical aspect of a new software library is the ease of adoption.
nGraph-HE leverages Intel nGraph-TensorFlow [14] for seamless
integration with the TensorFlow DL library [2]. Modifying existing
TensorFlow code to use nGraph-HE requires adding only a single
line of code. See Appendix A.2 for a full example. This makes
nGraph-HE extremely easy to use. To use models from other DL
frameworks, such as MXNet, ONNX, and PyTorch, nGraph-HE
users must first export the DL model to nGraph’s serialized format.
nGraph-HE supports most operations commonly found in neu-
ral networks. Table 1 shows the full list of operations currently
supported by nGraph-HE, and the corresponding translation from
TensorFlow operations. Notably absent is the support for MaxPool
and ReLU operations. This is because HE supports only addition
and multiplication, through which MaxPool and ReLU operations
cannot be expressed.
4 EVALUATION
We tested nGraph-HE on a dual-socket Intel Xeon Platinum 8180
2.5GHz system with 376GB of RAM running Ubuntu 16.04. We used
SEAL’s implementation of CKKS and floating-point numbers for
these measurements, although we have also tested nGraph-HE with
SEAL’s BFV implementation. We report two main findings. First,
we leverage our compiler framework to implement HE-specific op-
timizations on small computation graphs. Second, we demonstrate
the ease of implementing convolutional neural networks using a
popular DL framework (TensorFlow), on both the MNIST [37] and
CIFAR-10 [35] datasets. For the MNIST dataset, we additionally:
• verify that the additional software layers through nGraph-
HE to the underlying HE library impose minimal overhead;
• demonstrate the HE-SIMD packing (Section 3.4.2) and special
plaintext value bypass (Section 3.4.1) optimizations;
• show the runtime dependence on three computing paradigms:
encrypted data, encrypted model, encrypted data and model.
For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we also demonstrate the BN folding
optimization.
4.1 GEMM operations
We first tested nGraph-HE on general matrix-matrix multiplication
(GEMM) operations, since these form the backbone of DLworkloads.
Figure 5 shows the runtime of computing AB +C , where A, B, and
C are n × n matrices of random integers, and where A ∈ C, while
B,C ∈ P. (This corresponds to the encrypted data, unencrypted
model use case where, A contains a user’s data while B and C are
model weights.) To demonstrate two different parameter settings,
we set the polynomial modulus degree to N = 213 and N = 214, and
used SEAL’s default ciphertext modulus for λ = 128-bit security.
To illustrate the power of enabling HE using graph compilers,
we perform the Optimized Multiply special plaintext value bypass
on the P × C multiplication operation (Section 3.4.1). We then
measured the runtime savings by randomly setting 50% and 80%
Figure 5: Single-threaded runtime on GEMM operations as a
function of matrix size, polynomial modulus, and sparsity.
of the B matrix to 1. These results correspond to the p1 = 0.5, 0.8
curves in Figure 5. Because multiplication is more expensive than
in most HE schemes, the runtime improvement is significant. The
larger point, however, is that providing HE in the context of a graph
compiler enables developers to provide HE-specific optimizations to
the backend while data scientists continue to use the DL framework
of their choice, treating HE as just another (virtual) hardware target.
4.2 Graph-level optimizations
To demonstrate the utility of graph-level optimizations, we show
an example of BN folding. We perform Convolution on a 3-channel
10×10 input of shape (1,3,10,10) using 4 kernels per channel, each of
size 5 × 5, followed by BN. We consider two choices of parameters,
each with security level 128 < λ < 192: (1) N = 214, 7 50-bit
coefficient moduli; (2) N = 213, 4 50-bit coefficient moduli.4 Table 2
shows a moderate ∼4% decrease in runtime using BN folding, as
expected. The larger point, however, is that this HE-specific graph-
level optimization reduces the multiplicative depth Lf , enabling
smaller encryption parameters, thereby greatly improving both
runtime (∼4x) and memory usage.
Table 2: Single-threaded runtimes on Conv-BN function
when encrypting the data, using nGraph-HE directly. Run-
times are averaged across 10 trials.
N
BN
folding Lf
Runtime (s)
Conv BN Total
214 ✗ 2 130.83 ± 1.14 6.28 ± 0.12 137.24 ± 1.21
214 ✓ 1 130.57 ± 1.57 0.25 ± 0.01 130.97 ± 1.57
213 ✓ 1 33.06 ± 0.68 0.06 ± 0.00 33.16 ± 0.68
4.3 Neural networks
Next, to demonstrate the ease of using nGraph-HE, we implement
neural networks on the standard MNIST dataset [37], as well as the
more challenging CIFAR-10 dataset [35].
4A given set of encryption parameters achieves security level λ if the coefficient
modulus is smaller than SEAL’s default coefficient choice at the same (N , λ) pair [36].
For instance 7 × 50 = 350, which is between SEAL’s 305-bit (N = 214, λ = 128) and
438-bit modulus (N = 214, λ = 192), hence we achieve security level 128 < λ < 192.
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4.3.1 MNIST. The MNIST dataset consists of handwritten digits,
60,000 for training, and 10,000 for testing, and is a standard bench-
mark for DL on HE. The original CryptoNets network [28] is the
standard HE-friendly network for MNIST, with architecture given
in Appendix A.1. Appendix A.2 shows the code to implement this
network, which notably differs from the native TensorFlow code
by just one line. We achieve an accuracy of ∼99%, matching that
reported in [28].
One concern with adding software abstractions is the runtime
overhead. To measure this, we timed the network executing the
TensorFlow code with nGraph-HE as the backend. This incurs
the overhead of TensorFlow, the nGraph-TensorFlow bridge, and
nGraph IR compilation. Within this execution, we separately time
the sections that are also used in the execution of a C++ application
that executes the serialized network natively.
Table 3 shows the runtimes of these experiments, using N = 213,
N = 214. We use SEAL’s first 7 30-bit ciphertext coefficient moduli
for CKKS (i.e., q =
∏7
i=1 qi , with each qi consisting of 30-bits), for
security levels 128 < λ < 192 and λ > 256, respectively. Note that
the differences in times between the fourth and fifth columns (0.02s
and 0.03s), which capture the overhead of graph compilation and
bridging nGraph to TensorFlow, represent less than 0.1% of overall
runtime.
Table 3: Runtimes on CryptoNets network with and without
the overhead of TensorFlow integration and graph compila-
tion. Runtimes are averaged across 10 trials. Amortized run-
times are reported per image using batch size N /2 for maxi-
mum throughput and HE-SIMD slot utilization.
N Lf
Acc.
(%)
Runtime (s)
nGraph-HE TF+nGraph-HE Amortized
213 5 ∼99 16.70 ± 0.23 16.72 ± 0.23 0.004
214 5 ∼99 41.91 ± 1.58 41.94 ± 1.58 0.005
Another benefit of using a graph compiler with HE is that the
computation graphs provide opportunities to identify parallelism
that can be exploited by some HE schemes, such as the ability
to perform “HE-SIMD” operations on vectors of payload values
(Section 3.4). We implemented this capability and demonstrate it on
the CryptoNets network. Figure 6 shows the CryptoNets inference
runtime using batch sizes of 1 to 4096 for N = 213, 214. We picked
a maximum batch size of 212 = 4096 because CKKS performs HE-
SIMD operations on at most N /2 packed values. Note that runtimes
are independent of batch size, for each step in running the network.
Batching increases throughput significantly: for example, for the
N = 213 case, using a batch size of 4096 leads to an amortized
runtime of 4.1ms per image, compared to 16.7s for a batch size of 1.
Another optimization nGraph-HE implements is C × P opera-
tions, which are typically much faster than C × C operations, and
enable the three computing paradigms (encrypted data, model, or
both) discussed in Section 3.5. Using the CryptoNets network and
same cryptographic context, Table 4 shows the fastest runtime is
achieved when just the data is encrypted. Encrypting the model
incurs ∼3.2x runtime penalty, whereas encrypting the data and
Figure 6: Runtimes on pre-compiled CryptoNets network
with HE-SIMD packing for different batch sizes, for N = 213
( ) and N = 214 ( ).
the model incurs ∼3.6x runtime penalty. Users can switch between
the computing paradigms, enabling users to measure the privacy-
performance tradeoff.
Table 4: Runtimes on CryptoNets network when encrypt-
ing the data, the model, or both, using the TensorFlow
nGraph-HE integration. Runtimes are in seconds and aver-
aged across 10 trials.
N
Encrypt
Data Model Data and model
213 16.7 ± 0.2 53.3 ± 1.0 59.5 ± 1.7
214 41.9 ± 1.6 128.2 ± 1.2 142.6 ± 9.9
Finally, to demonstrate the benefit of special plaintext value
bypass (Section 3.4.1), we implement a binarized neural network.
We adapt the CryptoNets network by binarizing each weight in
the FC and Conv layers to {−1, 1}, using the approach in [22]. To
mitigate the diminished accuracy, we further add a non-binarized
BN layer after each FC and Conv layer. BN-folding is disabled to
preserve the binarization of the FC and Conv weights.
We consider two choices of parameters: 1) N = 214 , 9 30-bit
coefficient moduli, with security 192 < λ < 256; 2) N = 213, 7
30-bit coefficient moduli, with security 128 < λ < 192. As shown
in Table 5, enabling the Optimized Multiply special plaintext value
bypass provides a moderate ∼1.2x speedup. However, a more signif-
icant ∼3.7x runtime speedup arises due to the lower multiplicative
depth Lf , enabling a smaller choice of N . The runtime of 14.8s is
faster than 16.7s in the original CryptoNets network, at the cost of
reduced accuracy.
4.3.2 CIFAR-10. The CIFAR-10 dataset is a standard image classifi-
cation dataset consisting of 60,000 color images of shape 32× 32× 3,
of which 50,000 are used for training, and 10,000 are used for test-
ing, and with 6,000 examples for each of 10 different classes. The
larger image size and color channels make CIFAR-10 a significantly
more challenging task than MNIST. There is currently no seminal
CIFAR-10 HE-friendly network as there is for MNIST. Due to the use
of unbounded polynomial activations, numerical overflow during
training is prevalent, although gradient clipping and BN somewhat
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Table 5: Runtimes on binarized CryptoNets network when
encrypting the data, using the TensorFlow nGraph-HE inte-
gration. Runtimes are averaged across 10 trials.
N L Lf Optimized Mult. Runtime (s) Acc. (%)
214 9 8 ✗ 55.2 ± 2.3 96.9 ± 0.5
214 9 5 ✓ 45.2 ± 1.3 96.9 ± 0.5
213 7 5 ✓ 14.8 ± 0.9 96.9 ± 0.5
mitigate this effect. We implement a CIFAR-10 network with archi-
tecture given in Appendix A.1. To demonstrate the versatility of
our framework, we train the CIFAR-10 network in four different
configurations, by toggling two independent settings:
• BN. If enabled, a BN layer is added after each Conv layer.
During training, we use batch size n = 128; during inference,
we use HE-SIMD packing to enable batch size n = 8192.
• Trained activations. If enabled, each polynomial activation is
of the form ax2 + bx , with a initialized to 0, and b initialized
to 1, and with a,b updated during training. If disabled, each
polynomial activation is 0.125x2 + 0.5x + 0.25, following the
approach in [21].
Furthermore, to prevent numerical overflow during training, we clip
the gradients to [−0.25, 0.25]. To demonstrate the advantage of our
graph-level optimizations, we toggle the BN folding optimization
where BN is used. The CIFAR-10 network has a multiplicative depth
Lf = 8, which is significantly deeper than the CryptoNets network,
with Lf = 5. In order to accommodate this additional depth, we
choose 10 30-bit ciphertext coefficient moduli, and N = 214 for se-
curity level λ = 192 [36]. When BN folding is disabled, Lf increases
to 10. Accordingly, we use 11 30-bit ciphertext moduli for a reduced
security level of 128 < λ < 192.
Table 6: Runtimes on CIFAR-10 network when encrypting
the data, using the direct nGraph-HE integration. Runtimes
and accuracies are averaged across 10 trials. Amortized run-
times are per image, using batch size N /2 for maximum
throughput and HE-SIMD slot utilization.
L Lf BN/fold Act.
Accuracy
(%)
Runtime (s)
Total Amortized
11 10 ✓/ ✗ Train 62.1 ± 6.4 1628 ± 37 0.199
11 8 ✓/ ✓ Train 62.1 ± 6.4 1637 ± 42 0.200
10 8 ✓/ ✓ Train 62.1 ± 6.4 1350 ± 22 0.165
11 10 ✓/ ✗ Fix 62.2 ± 3.5 1641 ± 32 0.200
11 8 ✓/ ✓ Fix 62.2 ± 3.5 1651 ± 33 0.202
10 8 ✓/ ✓ Fix 62.2 ± 3.5 1359 ± 19 0.166
10 8 ✗ Tr 55.6 ± 6.7 1321 ± 20 0.161
10 8 ✗ Fix 57.8 ± 1.3 1324 ± 13 0.161
Table 6 shows the runtimes of the CIFAR-10 network, which are
significantly higher than the MNIST CryptoNets network, due to
the increased complexity of the model and dataset. BN provides
a significant increase in accuracy, as polynomial activations are
constrained within a narrower range. We observe Lf is constant
when BN folding optimization is enabled. Enabling BN-folding
reduces Lf from 10 to 8, with negligible speedup. However, the
reduced multiplicative depth allows for use of fewer ciphertext
moduli, which provides a ∼1.2x speedup.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have presented nGraph-HE, a backend to the Intel nGraph
DL compiler, which enables DL on homomorphically encrypted
data. nGraph-HE supports a variety of DL frameworks such as
TensorFlow to allow easy adoption by data scientists. We have
demonstrated the capability of nGraph-HE to implement networks
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 with minimal computational and code
overhead. Furthermore, we demonstrated several optimizations,
including special plaintext value bypass, HE-SIMD packing, graph-
level optimizations, and plaintext operations. The data scientist can
take advantage of these optimizations with only minimal changes
to their code, enabling rapid prototyping and development.
Looking ahead, an additional benefit of using graph compilers in
the context of HE is the ability to extract the computational (espe-
cially multiplicative) depth of the computation, which is needed to
set the security parameters of the HE scheme. A useful extension of
this work, therefore, would be to enable automatic selection of HE
parameters at compile time as a function of desired security level.
Another area for future work is to incorporate recent optimizations
for matrix operations in HE [34]. Finally, we would like to extend
this framework so that it can also include hybrid schemes that
combine HE with multi-party-computation (MPC), such as garbled
circuits [6, 51], or oblivious transfer [12, 26, 30]. Such hybrids have
been shown [34] to deliver much faster performance at the expense
of higher communication costs. The optimal decomposition of a DL
workload into HE and MPC stages could be determined at compile
time and would be greatly facilitated by access to the underlying
computation graph.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Network Architectures
For each architecture, n indicates the batch size.
• CryptoNets, with activation Act(x) = x2.
(1) Conv. [Input: n × 28 × 28; stride: 2; window: 5 × 5; filters:
5, output: n × 845] + Act.
(2) FC. [Input: n × 845; output: n × 100] + Act.
(3) FC. [Input: n × 100; output: n × 10].
• Binarized CryptoNets, with activation Act(x) = x2.
(1) BinaryConv. [Input: n × 28 × 28; stride: 2; window: 5 × 5;
filters: 5, output: n × 845] + BN + Act.
(2) BinaryFC. [Input: n × 845; output: n × 100] + BN + Act.
(3) BinaryFC. [Input: n × 100; output: n × 10] + BN.
• CIFAR-10 network, with polynomial activation.
(1) Conv. [Input: n×32×32×3; stride: 2; window: 5×5; filters:
40, output: n × 40 × 16 × 16] + (BN ) + Act.
(2) AvgPool. [Input: n × 32 × 32 × 3; stride: 2; window: 5 × 5,
filters: 40, output: n × 40 × 8 × 8].
(3) Conv. [Input: n× 40× 8× 8; stride: 1; window: 3× 3; filters:
80, output: n × 80 × 8 × 8] + (BN ) + Act.
(4) FC. [Input: n × 5120, output: n × 10].
A.2 CryptoNets Inference
Figure 7 shows a full example of performing inference on the Cryp-
toNets model. Note that the only modification required to enable
nGraph-HE is the addition of the import ngraph_bridge line.
""" CryptoNets MNIST classifier """
import ngraph_bridge # <-- enable nGraph -HE
import numpy as np
from tensorflow.examples.tutorials.mnist import input_data
import tensorflow as tf
batch_size = 4096
mnist = input_data.read_data_sets(
'/tmp/tensorflow/mnist/input_data ', one_hot=True)
# Create inference network
parameter_0 = tf.placeholder(tf.float32 , [None , 784])
reshape_5_7 = tf.reshape(parameter_0 , [-1, 28, 28, 1])
constant_4 = tf.constant(
np.loadtxt('W_conv1.txt', dtype='f').reshape ([5, 5, 1, 5]))
convolution_8 = tf.nn.conv2d(
reshape_5_7 , constant_4 , strides =[1, 2, 2, 1], padding='VALID ')
multiply_10 = tf.square(convolution_8)
constant_3 = tf.constant ([[0, 0], [0, 1], [0, 1], [0, 0]])
pad_11 = tf.pad(multiply_10 , constant_3)
reshape_12 = tf.reshape(pad_11 , [-1, 845])
constant_2 = tf.constant(
np.loadtxt("W_squash.txt", dtype='f').reshape ([845, 100]))
dot_13 = tf.matmul(reshape_12 , constant_2)
multiply_14 = tf.square(dot_13)
constant_1 = tf.constant(np.loadtxt('W_fc2.txt', dtype='f').reshape ([100, 10]))
y_conv = tf.matmul(multiply_14 , constant_1)
# Run network
with tf.Session () as sess:
x_test = mnist.test.images [: batch_size]
y_conv_val = y_conv.eval(feed_dict ={ parameter_0: x_test })
(a) Python code to execute a trained CryptoNets model using TensorFlow
(b) Computational graph generated from the Python
code by the nGraph compiler
Figure 7: Source code and intermediate representation of the MNIST CryptoNets network.
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B NGRAPH-HE ARTIFACT APPENDIX
Code and runtime artifacts to replicate runtime results are publicly
available at https://github.com/NervanaSystems/he-transformer/
tree/v0.2-benchmarks-2
Specifically, the benchmarks folder contains detailed instructions
on how to replicate the results, including our own runtime results
from which the tables and figures were created.
Performance analysis completed on Jan 16 - Mar 21, 2019 using
a Xeon Platinum 8180 platform with 112 CPUs operating at 2.5Ghz,
2 sockets, and 376GB of RAM running HE Transformer (v0.2) with
nGraph-tf (v0.9.0) and nGraph (v0.11.0) on Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS.
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